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Abstract
In this paper we study the co-existence of two well known trading protocols, bargaining and
price-posting. To do so we consider a frictional environment where buyers and sellers play
price-posting and bargaining games infinitely many times. Sellers switch from one market
to the other at a rate that is proportional to their payoff differentials. Given the different
informational requirements associated with these two trading mechanisms, we examine
their possible co-existence in the context of informal and formal markets. Other than
having different trading protocols, we also consider other distinguishing features. We find
a unique stable equilibrium where price-posting (formal markets) and bargaining (informal
markets) co-exist. In a richer environment where both sellers and buyers can move across
markets, we show that there exists a unique stable dynamic equilibrium where formal and
informal activities also co-exist whenever sellers’ and buyers’ net costs of trading in the
formal market have opposite signs.
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1 Introduction
The literature examining the emergence and persistence of various trading protocols has a long
tradition in economics. Among trading protocols, bargaining was the predominant selling institu-
tion, while auctions appeared later, as shown by Cason et al. (2003), Milgrom and Weber (1982),
and Krishna (2003). In contrast, price-posting by sellers is a relatively recent phenomenon which
can be dated back to 1823, when Alexander Stewart introduced posted prices in his New York
City ‘Marble Dry Goods Palace’.
Trying to understand which trading mechanisms survive is the focus of some of the evolu-
tionary literature. In a seminal article, Lu and McAfee (1996) consider a frictional environment
where a large number of homogeneous buyers and sellers trade in markets. Agents who transact
leave the market, and a fraction of the remaining agents are also removed. All these agents are
replaced by new identical players. Within this framework, the authors show that both auctions
and bargaining are equilibria. But only auctions are evolutionarily stable. In the same spirit,
Kultti (1999) analyzes posted price markets and auctions. The author finds that posted price
markets are equivalent to those that use auctions.1 This is because in auctions, the seller settles
for his reservation utility if only one buyer appears, whereas if many buyers visit the seller, it is
the buyers who must settle for their reservation utility. Instead in posted price, the seller’s share
of the surplus is the same regardless of the number of buyers who visit him, as shown by Burdett,
Shi and Wright (2001). Here, we complement the previous analysis by studying bargaining and
price posting.2
In this paper, we explore the potential co-existence of price posting and bargaining markets.
We do so in the context of formal and informal activities. This is a natural avenue to explore
such issues, as the informational demands of price posting and bargaining are very different, in
ways that correspond to formal and informal activities, respectively. Following the evolutionary
setup of Lu and McAfee (1996), in this paper we determine under what circumstances bargaining
(informal markets) and price posting (formal markets) can co-exist and deliver a unique stable
equilibrium.3 In doing so, we also contribute to the literature that studies informal activities. As
opposed to Lu and McAfee (1996) and Kultti (1999), here every agent leaves the market at the
end of each period and their offspring replace them.4 We then consider best response dynamics,
1With homogenous reservation prices and small markets, however, Julien, Kennes, and King (2001) show that
auctions are preferred by sellers.
2Lu and McAfee (1996) point out “in markets where bargaining persists, there must be some factors which make
bargaining preferable to auctions. The effects of such factors must be strong enough to override the structural
advantages of auctions”. Similarly, Kultti (1999) points out that “even though auctions and posted prices turn
out to be equivalent one rarely sees auction markets”.
3The recent New Monetarist literature considers trading mechanisms and matching technologies as part of
their environment; see for instance Lagos and Wright (2005).
4Thus, ours is a very slow-moving replacement process for buyers and sellers compared to that of Lu and
McAfee (1996) and Kultti (1999).
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where buyers and sellers play the price-posting and bargaining game infinitely many times. In our
baseline model, sellers switch from one market to the other at a rate that is proportional to the
payoff differential between the two markets, and we allow the adjustment process to take place
at different speeds. In contrast, buyers cannot switch between markets. However, in the second
part of the paper we allow both sellers and buyers to switch. We then explore the equilibrium
properties of this environment and determine when a unique stable equilibrium exists.
As previously mentioned, via their informational requirements, we can relate bargaining and
price posting to informal and formal market activities, respectively. This is because the in-
formational requirements to implement price-posting and bargaining are quite different. This
important distinction yields further insights on the co-existence of formal and informal markets.
While the definition of informal economies is subject to some disagreement, there is never any
debate that sellers in these markets strive to remain anonymous from taxing and regulatory au-
thorities.5 Informal sellers do not want to provide any public information about their locations
and/or prices, in order to avoid the taxes and regulatory costs associated with formal markets.
Thus, price posting is incompatible with informal activity, because it requires public observ-
ability of the sellers’ terms of trade and locations. Instead, informal sellers must use a trading
mechanism that provides limited public information about their whereabouts in order to remain
hidden from the taxing and regulating authorities.6 For this reason, informal markets resort
to bargaining, which requires a minimal amount of public information when compared to price
posting, as the terms of trade can always be renegotiated.7 On the other hand, sellers trading
in formal markets must publicly advertise their prices and locations to attract buyers.
To determine the robustness of the co-existence between formal and informal activities, we
consider other differentiating features between these markets that have been previously high-
lighted in the literature. For instance, we consider the possibility of theft and confiscation in
informal markets as well as different meeting technologies. We also explore the role of quality
assurance when purchasing in formal sellers.8 Within this environment, we find that when buyers
cannot switch between formal and informal markets, some fraction of sellers will migrate from
formal to informal markets whenever: (i) the formal sellers’ advantage in providing quality assur-
5The vast majority of informal sector activities involves goods and services whose production and distribution
are perfectly legal. The informal sector merely seeks to evade taxes and regulations. Clearly, illegal goods are also
an important component of the informal economy. But we have chosen not to incorporate them, as the literature
has not yet come to an agreement on how to model them. We refer to the reader to Feige (1990), De Soto (1989)
and Portes et al. (1989), among others, for more on informal markets.
6It is important to note that informative advertising, which coincides with the inception of price-posting, is
an essential feature for this trading institution to be effective. In price-posting sellers need to send informative
signals describing their product, price and location in order to attract buyers as documented by Bagwell (2007).
7Auctions are clearly not suitable for informal markets as auctions are, by definition, public events.
8Note that since formal sellers are in fixed locations and are publicly observed by buyers and authorities,
formal sellers can credibly provide such contracts. This practice is consistent with anti-lemon laws enforcing
certain money-back guarantees prevalent in the formal markets in real life. In contrast, informal sellers cannot
credibly provide such assurances to their customers as they do not legally exist.
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ance erodes, (ii) the government imposes higher taxes and regulations in the formal market, (iii)
the risk of crime and/or confiscation decreases in the informal market, and (iv) the number of
buyers in the informal market increases.9 These results may seem odd if one naively combined the
results of Lu and McAfee (1996) and Kultti (1999), which would intuitively suggest that “posted
price markets dominate bargaining markets”. Our results differ because agents in our environ-
ment are replaced differently from the previous authors and also because we consider various
additional features that distinguish formal and informal markets. These additional asymmetries
between the two competing markets are not present in Lu and McAfee (1996) nor Kultti (1999).
These extra differences (taxes, theft and quality assurance) are key in determining the resulting
equilibria that delivers co-existence between the two trading protocols because they affect the
seller’s payoffs when trading in formal and informal markets. In particular, since we consider an
evolutionary framework, the differential payoffs are crucial in determining the measure of sellers
that trade in formal and informal markets over time.
When both sellers and buyers can switch between formal and informal markets, analytical
results are not possible, and a numerical exercise is required to determine additional equilibrium
properties. We find that, for a broad range of parameter values, if the net lump-sum cost for
a seller in the formal sector (relative to that in the informal sector) has the opposite sign of
the net lump-sum cost for a buyer in the formal sector (relative to that in the informal sector),
then there exists a locally stable equilibrium in which formal and informal markets co-exist. If
the two relative net lump-sum costs are both negative, then there exists a unique locally stable
equilibrium where only formal activity takes place in the long run. In contrast, if the two relative
net lump-sum costs are both positive, then there exists a unique locally stable equilibrium with
only informal trade taking place.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 develops the benchmark model, where sellers are mobile and buyers are fixed. Section
4 develops a more general model, where both buyers and sellers are mobile. Section 5 concludes.
Appendix A contains the proofs of all results stated in the text. Appendix B describes another
interpretation of our results, in a model of replicator/imitation dynamics. Appendix C provides
an alphabetical index of all the notation used in the paper, while Appendix D contains some
additional figures useful in interpreting the results from Section 4.
2 Related Literature
This paper relates to two different strands of literature. One literature explores the equilibrium
obtained in frictional environments where various trading mechanisms are considered. The other
one studies the equilibrium properties of economies with formal and informal markets.
9Conversely, sellers will switch from the informal to the formal market whenever the opposite changes occur.
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Since Diamond (1971), much more attention has been paid to the explicit microstructure of
markets and trading institutions. This increased attention has come from different perspectives.
For instance, McAfee (1993), Peters (1994) and Peters (1995), among others, highlight that the
institutions that govern trade themselves are endogenous. These authors explore how endogenous
equilibrium institutions may emerge while using a mechanism design approach. When various
trading protocols are considered, Arnold and Lippman (1995), Ehrman and Peters (1994), and
Lu and McAfee (1996), Kultti (1999) and Julien et al. (2002), among others, compare different
trading mechanisms to determine the advantages of these institutions and in which markets these
are more suitable. These authors typically explore frictional environments, auctions and posted
prices.10 A robust result in this literature is that in large markets, price posting and auctions
generate the same revenue and are efficient. In this paper, we complement this literature, by
exploring when bargaining and price posting can co-exist in a large frictional and evolutionary
environment.
Regarding theoretical frameworks that incorporate formal and informal activity, Rauch (1991)
considers various forms of regulation avoidance and the emergence of the informal sector. Within
the same spirit, Nicolini (1998) considers tax evasion as the main cause for informal activities
to exist alongside formal markets.11 Subsequent general equilibrium models employ existing es-
timates of the informal economy for calibration purposes. For instance, Koreshkova (2006) and
Aruoba (2010) consider optimal taxation models and aim at rationalizing observed income and
inflation tax rates for a cross section of countries. Meanwhile, Ordonez (2014) assess the quan-
titative effect of incomplete tax enforcement on aggregate output and productivity in Mexico.
Typically, the general equilibrium analyses that study the co-existence of informal and formal
markets share the assumption that these activities are different in nature. These differences are
such that either the goods being produced in formal and informal markets are assumed to be
different, as in Aruoba (2010), or the technologies used to produce the goods in both markets or
the means of payment required to obtain the goods in formal and informal markets are assumed
to be different, as in Koreshkova (2006), Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007), Amaral and Quintin
(2006), Prado (2011) and D’Erasmo and Boedo (2012). This literature, however, has not fully
explored how the co-existence of formal and informal activity is affected when there are different
trading mechanisms, matching technologies and informational requirements. Notable exceptions
are Aruoba (2010) and Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014), who consider an environment where firms
10The use of auctions has traditionally been motivated by the existence of a monopoly seller possessing imperfect
information about the buyers’ valuations of the object for sale. On the other hand, price-posting has usually been
motivated by the sale of goods whose value is commonly understood, no bidding takes place, and the good may
be rationed according to some rule.
11In particular, Rauch (1991) considers an environment with a minimum wage policy that can only be enforced
for sufficiently large firms. This results in smaller firms operating in the informal sector and paying lower wages.
Meanwhile, Nicolini (1998) shows how inflation is optimal when tax evasion in the informal market is widespread,
as income generated by cash is difficult to monitor by tax authorities.
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produce goods in different markets while using different trading protocols. We complement these
papers.
3 Benchmark Model
Consider an economy with a large number of buyers and sellers. Time is continuous. At any
point in time, capacity-constrained sellers produce at most one indivisible unit of a homoge-
neous perishable good. Thus, it is not possible for sellers to accumulate an inventory of unsold
goods. Buyers can purchase this good in either formal or informal markets. Moreover, buyers
can only visit one seller at a given point in time. However buyers, before deciding which mar-
ket to participate in, cannot coordinate among themselves to minimize the possibility of being
rationed.12
Formal buyers trade in a market with posted terms of trade where all buyers can see their
advertised prices and locations. In contrast, informal sellers trade in markets where the trading
protocol is bargaining. As a benchmark, we assume that buyers are exogenously divided between
formal and informal markets. Let bfo (bin) be the ratio of buyers in the formal (informal) market
vis-a`-vis the total number of sellers in both markets; thus, bfo + bin = b where b denotes the ratio
of buyers to sellers in the economy as a whole. In contrast to buyers, sellers can switch between
formal and informal markets. Let sfo (sin) denote the fraction of sellers in the formal (informal)
market. Thus we have that sfo + sin = 1. These fractions can change over time, as the relative
payoffs for sellers in formal and informal markets differ.13
The simplifying assumption that only sellers can switch between formal and informal markets
allows us to obtain analytical solutions. It also reflects the fact that the predominant factor for
sellers in deciding where to locate their business is to be close to buyers. This is not the case for
most buyers, where accessibility to sellers is not of first order importance. Households also take
into account other factors (such as access to the workplace, schools and commuting costs) when
deciding where to locate. Given these considerations, we can think of buyers as being streamed
into one market or the other on the basis of exogenous factors. In contrast, sellers’ decision of
where to location and produce is endogenous and strategic.
In the next subsection, we describe the underlying preferences of buyers and sellers, the
characteristics that distinguish formal and informal markets, as well as the different trading
mechanisms and matching technologies.
12Note that when more than one buyer visits a seller, the seller needs to select which buyer to sell the good.
For more details we refer to Burdett et al. (2001).
13In an alternative interpretation of our model, there are no separate populations of formal and informal
agents. All agents participate in both formal and informal markets, where informal transactions are cash-only.
In this interpretation, sfo (sin) denotes the fraction of each seller’s transactions which are formal (informal). The
equilibria in our model then correspond to mixed strategy Nash equilibria. See Remarks 1 and 2 for details.
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3.1 Preferences
Buyers and sellers have quasilinear preferences. A buyer in the formal (informal) market obtains
a value of vfobu (v
in
bu) when she consumes a unit of the good.
14 Thus, if the formal (informal) market
price of the good is pfo ( pin), then the formal (informal) buyer obtains a total payoff of vfobu − pfo
(vinbu − pin) after trade has taken place. On the other hand, formal (informal) sellers incur a cost
of cfose (cinse) per unit of good produced, which includes both labor and other input costs. Thus,
the per period total payoff of formal (informal) sellers is pfo − cfose (pin − cinse).15
In order for trades to occur in both markets, individual rationality for both buyers and sellers
has to be satisfied. This requires that cfose ≤ pfo ≤ vfobu and cinse ≤ pin ≤ vinbu always have to hold.
Let gfo := vfobu − cfose denote the “gains from trade” in the formal market, while gin := vinbu − cinse
represent the total “gains from trade” in the informal market. Without loss of generality, we
normalize the buyer and seller’s utility functions so that gfo = 1.16 If agents do not trade, then
buyers and sellers obtain a zero payoff.
3.2 Formal versus Informal Markets: Further Differences
Apart from their trading mechanisms, formal and informal markets differ along other dimensions.
The literature on formal and informal markets has emphasized other features that are quite
different across these markets.17 For instance, formal sellers are taxed, have to comply with
regulations and typically offer quality assurance when selling their products. Meanwhile, informal
sellers are more susceptible to face theft, bribery, fines and confiscations.18 In the next subsections
we elaborate how these other distinguishing features of formal and informal markets affect the
co-existence of formal and informal markets.
3.2.1 Taxation, Regulation, Confiscation and Theft
As in Nicolini (1998) Aruoba (2010) and Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014), among others, we assume
that formal sellers face a profit tax.19 Let us denote the effective tax rate for a formal seller as T
fo
se .
In the informal sector, sellers do not pay taxes nor incur any regulation cost. However, informal
sellers face the possibility that their part of their profits be taken away from the government
(through a fine) or by criminals (through theft). As in Prado (2011), these costs are assumed to
14In Section 3.2, we will explain why, in general, vinbu < v
fo
bu .
15In Section 3.2, we will explain why, in general, cinse < cfose .
16In Section 3.2, we will see that, in general, gin < gfo .
17Feige (1990), De Soto (1989) and Portes et al. (1989), among others, provide a detailed description of the
differences between informal and formal markets.
18We refer to the reader to Putnins and Sauka (2015) and Chmielowski (2015) for more on these issues.
19Note the profit tax is equivalent to a value added tax on the sale of the goods.
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be proportional to informal earnings.20 These payments effectively function as a form of “income
tax” on the informal sector. Let T
in
se represent the “effective tax rate” of operating in the informal
economy.21
3.2.2 Quality Assurance
An important distinguishing feature of formal markets relative to informal ones —and one which
has not previously been emphasized by the literature— is the provision of quality assurance.22
Since formal sellers are registered and monitored by government authorities, they can credibly
write contracts that provide warranties to their customers. In contrast, informal sellers cannot
credibly offer such quality assurance, as informal market transactions do not exist within the
confines of the legal system.
To incorporate this aspect, let us consider uncertainty regarding the quality of the product
purchased by the buyer. In particular, we assume that all sellers have access to the same technol-
ogy, so that the probability of faulty goods is the same in formal and informal markets. Let cinse
be the unit cost of sellers producing in the informal market, i.e., the unit cost of sellers producing
the good without any quality assurance. Let q be the per unit cost that each formal seller incurs
when providing quality assurance. Thus, with quality assurance, the unit cost of production for
formal sellers becomes cfose = cinse + q. To simplify exposition, we assume that formal sellers pass
all of the quality assurance costs q onto the buyer.
When a good is defective, it provides less utility to the buyer. Thus, if vinbu is the expected
utility to the buyer of the good purchased in the informal market, then vinbu < v
fo
bu . The total
value for the buyer of purchasing the good in the formal market is denoted by vfobu = v
in
bu + α(q),
where α(q) is the benefit that each formal buyer receives from quality assurance. We assume
that α is increasing, differentiable, and concave function of q, with α(0) = 0.23
Lemma A If α(·) is increasing, differentiable, and concave, and formal sellers provide the
efficient level of quality assurance, then gin ≤ gfo.
The trading protocols employed in the formal and informal markets specify how the gains
from trade are split between the buyer and the seller. Thus, the fact gin ≤ gfo implies that there
is generally a larger surplus to be divided in the formal market, so that both buyer and seller
20This can capture the probability that an informal seller’s profit can be stolen or their merchandise be confis-
cated by government authorities.
21We refer to Donovan (2008) for more on the costs of operating in the informal market.
22This can take many forms such as free repair/replacement, a full money-back guarantee, on-site customer
service, twenty-four hour telephone customer assistance, and/or cash compensation for unsatisfactory product
performance.
23Concavity is a very reasonable assumption in this context, because α is generally bounded above:
limq→∞ α(q) = v∗ − vinbu , where v∗ is the value of consuming a “perfect” commodity, with no defects upon
repair or replacement. Note that given the concavity of α and the linearity of cfose in q , there is an optimal amount
of q, which may lead to a less-than-full replacement or less-than-perfect repair.
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can potentially be better off. This, in turn, implies that the government can tax a fraction of up
to T0 = gfo − gin without driving participants into the informal market.24
3.3 Trading Mechanisms and Matching Technologies
Below we provide details regarding the formal and informal markets’ respective matching tech-
nologies and trading protocols.
3.3.1 Formal Markets
In order to capture the informational requirements of formal sellers, we use the price-posting and
directed-search framework of Burdett et al. (2001). In the formal market, the ex ante identical
sellers each have a precise location at any point in time. In order to attract buyers, these formal
sellers advertise their prices and location. The information contained in these advertisements are
costlessly seen by all relevant ex ante identical uncoordinated buyers.
Since sellers compete for buyers, and these buyers cannot coordinate which seller to visit,
sellers and buyers in the formal market play a strategic game of complete information composed
of three stages. In the first stage, sellers simultaneously, independently and costlessly advertise
a single posted price as well as their location.25 In the second stage, buyers observe prices, and
simultaneously and independently choose which seller(s) to visit. In the third stage, matches
are realized and trade takes place. As in Burdett et al. (2001), we assume that, after visiting
one seller, buyers find it prohibitively costly to search again within the same period. So, for any
given period of time, each buyer can visit only one seller, but a seller can be visited by multiple
buyers. In that case, the seller sells his product to a randomly chosen buyer.
Note that, in this environment, formal buyers are more likely to visit a formal seller with the
lowest posted price. But since buyers are not coordinated, they may face more competition at
these cheaper locations. If multiple buyers choose to visit the same seller, then only one of the
buyers can purchase the good, while the rest of buyers receive a payoff of 0. On the other hand,
if no buyers visit a seller, then he cannot sell his good, so he receives a payoff of 0.26
Since all buyers are ex ante identical, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium where buyers
use the same mixed strategy when deciding which seller(s) to visit. Likewise, since all sellers are
24All buyers have identical preferences. If we relaxed this assumption and considered buyer heterogeneity in
terms of income or preferences, then those who are poorer, less risk-averse, and/or have a higher discount rate
would prefer the cheaper but less reliable goods of the informal market. This, buyer heterogeneity alone could
explain the co-existence of the two markets. Introducing heterogeneity amongst buyers (or sellers) would only
strengthen our conclusions as there is more scope for co-existence.
25We refer to Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2017) for the properties of equilibrium under price posting and auctions
in environments where advertising is costly and its reach is probabilistic.
26In contrast to Camera and Selcuk (2009), here prices posted by sellers cannot be renegotiated depending on
market conditions, so that there is no distinction between the posted list price and the sale price
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also ex ante identical, they all use the same pricing strategy. The next theorem summarizes the
main results of Burdett et al. (2001).
Theorem BSW Let m be the total number of sellers in the formal market, and let Bf be the
ratio of buyers to sellers in the formal market (so there are Bf m buyers). There is a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium of the formal market game where all sellers post an identical price,
p, and all buyers randomly visit all sellers with equal probability. Let Φ be the probability that
any given seller sells his product (i.e. is visited by at least one buyer), and let Ω be the probability
that any given buyer purchases the good. Then p, Φ, and Ω are entirely determined by Bf and
m. Furthermore, if we let m→∞ while holding Bf fixed, then we get:
p(Bf ) := lim
m→∞
p(Bf ,m) = cfose + ufose(Bf ), (1)
where ufose(Bf , ) := 1− Bf
eBf − 1 . (2)
Also, P
fo
se (Bf ) := lim
m→∞
Φ(Bf ,m) = 1− e−Bf , (3)
and P
fo
bu(Bf ) := lim
m→∞
Ω(Bf ,m) =
P
fo
se (Bf )
Bf
. (4)
Note that P
fo
se (Bf ) (P
fo
bu(Bf )) represents the probability that at any point in time any seller (buyer)
is able to sell (buy) the good. At any given point in time, if a seller makes a sale in the large formal
market (m→∞), then his pre-tax payoff is given by ufose(Bf ); otherwise his payoff is 0. Thus, the
seller’s pre-tax expected payoff in the large formal market game is U
fo
se (Bf ) := P
fo
se (Bf ) · ufose(Bf )
where Bf = bfo/sfo .
27
Given that the proportional tax rate paid by formal sellers is T
fo
se , the seller’s expected after-tax
payoff in the formal market is given by:
U˜
fo
se (sfo) := (1− T fose )U fose
(
bfo
sfo
)
= (1− T fose )
(
1− exp
(−bfo
sfo
))(
1− b
fo/sfo
exp(bfo/sfo)− 1
)
. (5)
Note that we write U˜
fo
se as a function of sfo only, because in the benchmark model, bfo is fixed.
27Recall that bfo is the ratio of buyers in the formal market relative to the total number of sellers in both
markets, while sfo is the fraction of sellers in the formal market to the total number of sellers in both markets.
Thus, we have that Bf = bfo/sfo .
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3.3.2 Informal Markets
Informal sellers cannot publicly advertise their exact locations and prices, or remain fixed in one
location, because they are trying to avoid government detection. So instead, would-be buyers
in the informal market must search in locations where informal sellers are known to congregate
(e.g. certain street corners, parking lots, and parks), and hope to randomly encounter one.28 We
therefore assume that in the informal market, buyers are randomly matched with sellers.
As in the formal sector, each informal buyer can visit only one seller per period, and buyers
cannot coordinate which seller to visit. Informal buyers search informal sellers with the matching
probabilities as in the directed search model of Burdett et al. (2001). Thus, if Bi := bin/sin is
the ratio of buyers to sellers in the informal market, then equation (3) in Theorem BSW implies
that the probability that any given informal seller makes a sale during any given period is given
by
P
in
se (Bi) = 1− e−Bi . (6)
Instead of trading at publicly posted prices, the informal seller and buyer negotiate a price
through bargaining, thereby splitting the total surplus, gin . Suppose that the informal seller
receives a fraction η(Bi) ∈ [0, 1] of this surplus, while the informal buyer receives the remaining
fraction 1 − η(Bi).29 Thus, a matched informal buyer then receives a payoff equal to uinse :=
η(Bi) gin . Then the resulting pre-theft/confiscation cost expected payoff for sellers in the informal
market is given by:
U
in
se
(
bin
sin
)
:= uinse · P inse
(
bin
sin
)
= gin η
(
bin
sin
)
P
in
se
(
bin
sin
)
. (7)
Clearly, the higher the ratio of buyers to sellers in the informal market, the stronger each
seller’s negotiating position or bargaining power becomes, and the better each seller will do in
bilateral bargaining. In the limit when there are infinitely many buyers for every seller, the sellers
will capture all of the surplus in the informal market. Thus, the seller’s bargaining power η is
an increasing function, such that:30
lim
Bi→∞
η(Bi) = 1. (8)
In our benchmark buyers cannot switch between informal and formal markets, thus bin is a
28Informal buyers have some vague notion where informal sellers congregate. Once they arrive at such location
there is random search among informal sellers. We refer to Donovan (2008) for more on the characteristics of
street vendors working in the underground economy.
29η(Bi) is a function of Bi (the ratio of buyers to sellers), which will determine the relative bargaining power
of a buyer and a seller. Later, in Section 4.2, we will present one possible model of this surplus division process,
but there is no need to commit to a specific model here.
30It would also be reasonable to assume lim
Bi↘0
η(Bi) = 0. But this is unnecessary for our analysis.
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constant. In contrast, sellers are able to switch between markets at any point in time. Since
sin = 1 − sfo , we can regard the informal seller’s utility as a function of sfo only. Thus, the
relevant expect payoff for the informal sellers after taking into account their confiscation/theft
cost is given by:
U˜
in
se (sfo) := (1− T inse )U inse
(
bin
1− sfo
)
= (1− T inse ) gin η
(
bin
1− sfo
) (
1− exp
( −bin
1− sfo
))
. (9)
3.4 Dynamic Equilibrium
In the previous sections we have specified the payoffs of buyers and sellers in the formal and
informal markets for a given point in time. To explore how the informal and formal markets
evolve over time, we need to specify how agents will adjust and consequently how their payoffs will
change over time. Here we consider this dynamic link between periods via our main equilibrium
concept, ‘best response dynamics’, where agents who can switch between markets will migrate
from one market to the other at a rate that is proportional to their market payoff differential.
More precisely, let sfo(t), and sin(t) represent the populations of formal/informal sellers at time
t, and let s˙fo(t) and s˙in(t) represent the derivatives of these functions at time t.31 Then we have
that the evolution of these populations is as follows:32
s˙fo(t) = −s˙in(t) = λse
(
U˜
fo
se (sfo(t))− U˜ inse (sfo(t))
)
, (10)
where U˜
in
fo (sfo) and U˜
in
se (sfo) are given by equations (5) and (9), while λse : R−→R is a strictly
increasing function that modulates the speed of adjustment and satisfies λse(0) = 0.
33 If mi-
gration from the formal to informal sector is exactly as difficult and costly as migration from
the informal to the formal sector, then λse will be an odd function.
34 However, if migrating in
one direction is more difficult than migrating in the other direction, then λse will not be an odd
function.35
31Formally, in a continuous-time model, where t ranges over the set of real numbers, we would define s˙fo :=
dsfo/dt and s˙in := dsin/dt. In a discrete-time model, where t ranges over the set of integers, we would define
s˙fo(t) := sfo(t + 1) − sfo(t) and s˙in(t) := sin(t + 1) − sin(t). Thus, the dynamical equation (10) admits both a
continuous-time and a discrete-time interpretation. The equilibrium characterization of Theorem 1 holds in both
cases.
32The expected utility of buyers in the informal market is irrelevant to the dynamics of this model, because we
have assumed that they cannot switch from informal to informal markets.
33 Typically, λse is just multiplication by a positive constant.
34That is: λse(−r) = −λse(r), for all real numbers r.
35If λse is an odd function, then the dynamical system converges to equilibrium just as quickly from either
direction. Thus, the informal market would show a symmetric response to tax increases and tax decreases, as
found by Christopoulos (2003) in Greece. To see how λse might not be odd, note that it might cost more for
a seller to switch from the informal market to the formal market than vice versa (e.g. because of the need to
acquire licenses, rent a retail location, etc.); this would be reflected by having |λse(r)| < |λse(−r)| for any given
r > 0. This is consistent with empirical findings by Giles et al. (2001) and Wang et al. (2012) in Taiwan and New
Zealand, respectively.
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An equilibrium of an economy where sellers can decide to produce in the formal and informal
markets is a fixed point of the dynamical system represented by equation (10). Given a fixed
fraction of buyers participating in the formal and informal market (bfo and bin respectively), sellers
will migrate between the two markets at a rate which is proportional to the payoff differential
between the two markets (of which speed of adjustment is modulated by λse), until their payoffs
from both markets are the same. Thus, the economy is in equilibrium if and only if sfo = s∗ is a
value such that:36
U˜
fo
se (s∗) = U˜
in
se (s∗). (11)
Remark 1. Although we have derived equation (11) using an evolutionary model, it could also
be interpreted as an uncorrelated, symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. This interpreta-
tion assumes a static environment, where each seller plays the mixed strategy (sfo , sin).37 This
could mean that she randomly chooses whether to participate in the formal or informal market
according to the probabilities (sfo , sin). Or it could mean that she spends a fraction sfo of her
time in the formal market and the remaining fraction sin in the informal market. In any case,
the sellers cannot coordinate, so there is no correlation between their strategies. The result is
that, at any point in time, a fraction sfo of sellers can be found in the formal market, while the
remaining fraction sin are in the informal market. Equation (11) is then equivalent to saying
that this profile of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium, as in Camera and Delacroix (2004) or
Michelacci and Suarez (2006).
There is also a third alternative framework that leads to the equilibrium represented by
equation (11), namely replicator/imitation dynamics. We refer the reader to Appendix B for
further details.
3.5 Existence and Properties of the Equilibrium
Let us define U˜(sfo) := U˜
fo
se (sfo)− U˜ inse (sfo); this represents the sellers’ net gain from being in the
formal market relative to the informal market. Note that the equilibrium condition, given by
equation (11), is equivalent to U˜(s∗) = 0.
We say that an equilibrium s∗ is locally stable if U˜ ′(s∗) < 0. We will say that s∗ is a
mixed market equilibrium if it has both formal and informal market of nontrivial size —that is,
0 < s∗ < 1. The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 1 If we satisfy the following conditions
1− b
fo + 1
exp(bfo)
<
(1− T inse ) gin
(1− T fose ) <
1
η(bin) (1− exp(−bin)) ,
36Throughout this paper, we use the term “equilibrium” to mean a stationary equilibrium —that is, one which
is unchanging over time.
37All sellers are ex ante identical, so they all play the same mixed strategy.
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then there exists a locally stable mixed market equilibrium s∗ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, the equilib-
rium fraction of formal sellers, s∗, has the following properties: (i) s∗ is decreasing as a function
of gin, T
fo
se , and bin; and (ii) s∗ is increasing as a function of T
in
se and bfo.
Recall that in the benchmark model bfo and bin are exogenous constants in this model. If
bfo = 0, then the equilibrium described in Theorem 1 yields sfo = 0. Likewise, if bin = 0, then we
will have sin = 0. However, if bfo and bin are both nonzero, then sfo and sin will also be nonzero
in equilibrium. Thus, for a broad range of parameters values, formal and informal markets of
nontrivial size will co-exist in a stable equilibrium. Note that as long as there are some buyers
in both formal and informal markets, all sellers cannot find it in their interest to settle in only
of one of the markets regardless of gin , T
fo
se and T
in
se . This is the case as there would be some
sellers that find profitable to switch to the other market with no sellers and being able to serve
the buyers in that market.
Theorem 1 also highlights what makes sellers move between markets and in which direction.
Part (ii) of Theorem 1 states that sellers will tend to migrate from the formal market to the
informal market if the formal market’s advantage in quality assurance erodes (gin increases rel-
ative to gfo), or the government imposes higher taxes and regulations (T
fo
se increases), or more
buyers migrate to the informal market (bin increases). Conversely, sellers will migrate from the
informal market back to the formal market whenever the opposite changes occur in these param-
eters. Likewise, sellers will migrate to the formal market if the risk of crime and/or confiscation
increases in the informal market (i.e. T
in
se increases) or if buyers migrate to the formal market (bfo
increases).38 The discrepancy between our results and the earlier results of Lu and McAfee (1996)
and Kultti (1999) is driven partly by the different agent-replacement dynamics in our model, and
partly because we explicitly model the way in which taxes, theft and quality assurance affect the
sellers’ payoffs when trading in formal and informal markets.
4 Both Buyers and Sellers Moving across Markets
Now we consider an environment where both sellers and buyers can switch among formal and
informal markets. In this new environment, the buyer populations, bin and bfo , and seller popula-
tions, sin and sfo , are endogenous and can change over time. As in Section 3, we will also consider
factors other than the trading mechanisms that distinguish formal and informal markets. Af-
ter describing the equilibria of this model (Result 2), we discuss corresponding the equilibrium
properties.
38One can also imagine circumstances where it is the buyers who are mobile, while the sellers are fixed —for
instance, tourists arriving at New York City who know where to find all formal and informal sellers. In that case,
it would not be difficult to see that the above result (and comparative statics) would still hold.
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4.1 Formal Markets
As in Section 3.3.1, the behaviour and payoffs of buyers and sellers in the formal market are
summarized in Theorem BSW, but the behaviour and payoffs of buyers and sellers in the informal
market need to be re-derived.
Recall that Bf = bfo/sfo is the ratio of buyers to sellers in the formal market. Then a formal
seller’s pre-tax expected utility is again given by U
fo
se (Bf ) := P
fo
se (Bf ) · ufose(Bf ), where P fose (Bf )
and ufose(Bf ) are defined in equations (2) and (3).
Let p(Bf ) be the formal market equilibrium price from equation (1). If a formal market buyer
makes a purchase, then her payoff is given by:
ufobu(Bf ) := v
fo
bu − p(Bf ) = vfobu − cfose − ufose(Bf )
= gfo − ufose(Bf ) = 1− ufose(Bf ) = Bf
eBf − 1 . (12)
If a buyer doesn’t make a purchase then her payoff is zero. Thus, her expected payoff for par-
ticipating in the large formal market game is U
fo
bu(Bf ) := P
fo
bu(Bf ) · ufobu(Bf ), where P fobu(Bf ) is
defined in equation (4).
4.2 Informal Markets
As in the formal market, we assume that informal sellers have fixed locations, and informal
buyers visit them.39 As in the previous section, the matching probabilities and tie breaking
rule are given by Burdett et al. (2001). Recall that, if Bi := bin/sin is the ratio of buyers to
sellers in the informal market, then the probability for a given seller to be visited by at least one
buyer during at any point in time is obtained by replacing Bf with Bi in equation (3), to obtain
P
in
se (Bi) = 1− e−Bi . Likewise, the probability of a given buyer obtaining the goods from the
one seller he visits is given by:
P
in
bu(Bi) =
P
in
se (Bi)
Bi
. (13)
In Section 3.2.1, we assume that the informal seller and buyer negotiate to split the surplus
according to proportions (η, 1 − η), where η depended on the ratio of buyers to sellers in this
market.40 Now, however, we need to model the negotiation process more explicitly, as the outside
options of buyers and sellers are relevant. This is the case as both buyers and sellers can switch
39In fact, this assumption is not critical; we could instead reverse the roles of buyers and sellers in the informal
market, so that it is the informal buyers who have fixed locations (home or workplace), and informal sellers who
visit them. This would correspond to the door-to-door selling strategy used by informal sellers in some developing
countries. If we define Si := sin/bin (i.e. the ratio of sellers to buyers in the informal market), then we obtain
P
in
bu(Si) = 1− e−Si and P inse (Si) = P
in
bu (Si)
Si
. This alternative model yields results which are qualitatively identical
to the results we present here.
40It was not necessary to be more specific about the negotiation process in order to obtain Theorem 1.
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markets, thus changing the surpluses that they can obtain. The trading mechanisms we use in
the informal market are the solution concepts of the Nash bargaining framework. Given our
assumptions about the utility functions of the buyer and seller, the (bargaining) set of feasible
utility allocations is the convex hull ∆ of the points (0, 0), (gin , 0), and (0, gin), where gin is the
total gains from trade to be divided in the informal market. The Pareto frontier of ∆ is the
diagonal line from (gin , 0) to (0, gin). Thus, the Nash bargaining, the egalitarian bargaining and
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions all yield the same outcome, which is the midpoint of
the diagonal line from (gin , 0) to (0, gin).41 Thus, it does not matter which particular bargaining
solution we use; the bargaining outcome is robust to any of the aforementioned trading protocols.
Within the Nash bargaining framework, the bargaining outcome is determined by the dis-
agreement payoffs of the two parties, namely the outside options available to buyers and sellers.
To endogenize these disagreement payoffs, we assume that agents in the informal market are re-
peatedly and randomly matched to counter-parties (as in Burdett et al. (2001)), with whom they
bargain. Importantly, we assume that this matching-and-bargaining process occurs on a much
faster timescale than the ones corresponding to agents’ consumptions and productions. We will
refer to each matching-and-bargaining period as a “turn”, and each production-and-consumption
period as a “chapter”. We assume that there are many turns per chapter. For instance, it may
be that each seller (buyer) can produce (consume) one unit per day, but they can meet and
bargain with a new counter-party every 15 minutes. Thus, assuming agents trade for 12 hours
per day, there would be almost 50 turns per chapter.
In reality, each chapter will have a finite (but large) number of turns. But for simplicity, we
will assume there are infinitely many turns per chapter. If the bargaining during a particular
turn is successful, then both buyer and seller immediately enjoy the gains from trade. They exit
the informal market for the rest of that chapter, and are replaced by a new buyer and seller
(perhaps agents who have just completed the production/consumption they began during the
previous chapter).42 However, if bargaining is not successful, then both agents must reenter the
informal market during the next turn and find a new counter-party to bargain with. This will
allow us to compute the disagreement payoffs of the two parties recursively.
Formally, let U
in
se be the expected payoff for a seller participating in the informal market
during a particular turn, and let U
in
bu be the expected payoff for a buyer participating in the
informal market during that turn. Note that U
in
se and U
in
bu are functions of Bi := bin/sin , the ratio
between informal buyers and sellers. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be the per-turn discount factor for all agents.
If bargaining breaks down during one turn, then both parties must re-enter the informal market
41The Nash solution selects the point in ∆ which maximizes the product of the buyer’s and seller’s utilities. The
egalitarian solution maximizes the minimum of the two utilities, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution maximizes
the minimum utility after both utilities have been rescaled, ranging from 0 to 1. In the domain ∆, it is clear
that the maximizers of all three trading protocols coincide with the midpoint of the diagonal line from (gin , 0) to
(0, gin). Indeed, this is true for any Pareto-efficient bargaining solution that respects the axiom of Symmetry.
42Thus, the population of buyers and sellers in the informal market does not change over the course of a chapter.
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during the next turn. Thus, the outside option for the seller is δ U
in
se (Bi), while the outside option
for the buyer is δ U
in
bu(Bi). Therefore, the Nash bargaining solution awards the seller a payoff of
uinse(Bi) and the buyer a payoff of uinbu(Bi), where these are given by:
43
uinse(Bi) =
δ U
in
se (Bi) + gin − δ U inbu(Bi)
2
;
and uinbu(Bi) =
δ U
in
bu(Bi) + gin − δ U inse (Bi)
2
.
(14)
Recall, however, that U
in
se (Bi) = P
in
se (Bi)uinse(Bi) and U
in
bu(Bi) = P
in
bu(Bi)uinbu(Bi). Once we sub-
stitute these expressions into (14), we obtain a pair of linear equations for uinse(Bi) and uinbu(Bi).
Solving these equations yields the following buyer and seller payoffs:44
uinse(Bi) = gin
δ P
in
bu(Bi)− 1
δ P
in
bu(Bi) + δ P
in
se (Bi)− 2
;
uinbu(Bi) = gin
δ P
in
se (Bi)− 1
δ P
in
bu(Bi) + δ P
in
se (Bi)− 2
.
(15)
4.3 Lump-sum Costs in Formal and Informal Markets
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, T
fo
se is the effective tax rate paid by sellers in the formal market.
As in Prado (2011), in this section we also consider other per-period costs that are incurred by a
seller who participates in these markets. In particular, a seller participating in the formal market
must incur lump-sum costs (independent of profits) which we will denote by L
fo
se . These lump-sum
costs involve the combined cost of having retail space and paying for licensing fees to comply
with government regulations (e.g. fire safety). Likewise, formal buyers incur transportation
costs that are independent of whether they acquire the product or not. These lump-sum costs
are represented by L
fo
bu .
When sellers operate in the informal market, they face an implicit “tax” rate T
in
se which reflects
the risks of theft and confiscation. Informal sellers may also have to pay bribes to corrupt police
officials or “protection fees” to organized crime against confiscation and theft risks; these are
lump-sum payments, independent of a seller’s earnings.45 Thus, we further assume that each
informal seller also incurs a lump-sum cost of L
in
se dollars. Informal buyers incur an opportunity
43Recall that the maximizer of the Nash trading protocols is the midpoint of the diagonal line from (gin , 0) to
(0, gin)
44If δ = 1, then the bargaining outcome (15) can be seen as a particular case of the abstract surplus-division
model considered in Section 3.3.2. To see this, let η(Bi) := uinse(Bi)/gin , where uinse(Bi) is defined as in Eq.(15).
Then η satisfies the conditions proposed in Section 3: it is an increasing function of Bi (because uinse is a decreasing
function of Bi, and the limit (8) holds because uinse(0) = gin .
45We refer to the reader to Putnins and Sauka (2015) and Chmielowski (2015) for more details.
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cost of waiting around for sellers to arrive; we represent this by a lump-sum cost of L
fo
bu dollars.
Let us define Lse := L
fo
se −Linse ( Lbu := Lfobu −Linbu) which represents the net lump-sum cost for
sellers (buyers) in the formal sector. (This could be positive or negative, depending on whether
the costs in the informal sector are lower or higher than those in the formal sector.) For modelling
purposes, it is equivalent to suppose that informal buyers and sellers face no lump sum costs,
whereas formal buyers and sellers face lump sum costs of Lbu and Lse respectively.
Let R
fo
se := 1−T fose (Rinse := 1−T inse ) denote the “residual” earnings rate of sellers in the formal
(informal) markets after proportional taxes are paid. Let Rse := R
fo
se/R
in
se ; this is effectively
the “net” residual earnings rate for formal sellers, if we normalize the informal sellers’ residual
earnings rate to 1. Note that this is equivalent to assuming that informal sellers capture all their
earnings, while formal sellers only capture a proportion Rse . This can represent a situation where
informal sellers face no risk of theft, while formal sellers pay an effective tax rate of Tax := 1−Rse .
Note that if expected losses due to theft in the informal market are higher that the formal tax
rate, then we will have Rse > 1, which implies that Tax < 0.
4.4 Dynamic Equilibrium
Having specified all differential costs of trading in formal and informal markets, we can now
analyze the corresponding dynamic equilibrium for this new environment. As in Section 3, we
consider the dynamic equilibrium induced primarily by best response dynamics. This yields the
following dynamic equations:
s˙fo(t) = −s˙in(t) = λse
(
(1− Tax)U fose
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− Lse − U inse
(
bin(t)
sin(t)
))
b˙fo(t) = −b˙in(t) = λbu
(
U
fo
bu
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− Lbu − U inbu
(
bin(t)
sin(t)
))
;
(16)
where b˙fo(t), b˙in(t), s˙fo(t), and s˙in(t) represent the corresponding time derivatives and λbu : R−→R
and λse : R−→R are strictly increasing functions that modulate the speed of adjustment, where
λbu(0) = 0 = λse(0).
As in Section 3, a seller finds the formal market more attractive than the informal market if
and only if (1−Tax)U fose (bfo/sfo)−Lse > U inse (sin/bin). Likewise, a buyer prefers the formal market if
and only if U
fo
bu(bfo/
bin
sin
sfo)−Lbu > U inbu(sin/bin). As a result, the necessary and sufficient condition
for a population distribution (bfo , bin , sfo , sin) to be an equilibrium is that these shares are a fixed
point of equation (16), which requires that
(1− Tax)U fose
(
bfo
sfo
)
− Lse = U inse
(
bin
sin
)
and U
fo
bu
(
bfo
sfo
)
− Lbu = U inbu
(
bin
sin
)
. (17)
Since bfo + bin = b and sfo + sin = 1, the market is completely described by the ordered pair
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(bin , sin), and equation (17) which reduces to:
(1− Tax)U fose
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
− Lse = U inse
(
bin
sin
)
and U
fo
bu
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
− Lbu = U inbu
(
bin
sin
)
. (18)
An equilibrium (b∗, s∗) is locally stable if there exists some neighbourhood U around (b∗, s∗) such
that, for any (bin , sin) ∈ U , the forward-time orbit of (bin , sin) under (16) converges to (b∗, s∗).
Graphically, it is easy to identify a locally stable equilibrium. To this end, let us rewrite (16)
more generally as follows:
b˙in = β(bin , sin) and s˙in = σ(bin , sin).
Here, β and σ are the functions appearing on the right hand side of equation (16). Then an
equilibrium is simply an intersection of the two isoclines B := {(bin , sin); β(bin , sin) = 0} and
S := {(bin , sin); σ(bin , sin) = 0}. Typically, B and S are smooth curves in the rectangular domain
[0, b]× [0, 1] and are given by:
S(Tax , Lse) :=
{
(sin , bin) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, b] ; (1− Tax)U fose
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
− Lse = U inse
(
bin
sin
)}
,
B(Lbu) :=
{
(sin , bin) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, b] ; U fobu
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
− Lbu = U inbu
(
bin
sin
)}
. (19)
The equilibrium (b∗, s∗) is locally stable if the following conditions are met in a neighbourhood
of (b∗, s∗):
(i) The absolute slope of B at (b∗, s∗) is larger than the absolute slope of S at this point.46
(ii) β is positive to the left of B, and negative to the right of B.
(iii) σ is positive below S, and negative above S.
If the population of informal buyers unilaterally dips below (above) b∗, then Condition (ii)
says that the payoff for informal buyers will be higher (lower) than the payoff for formal buyers,
causing buyers to migrate into (out of) the informal market until bin = b∗. Likewise, if the
population of informal sellers unilaterally dips below (above) s∗, then Condition (iii) says that
the payoff for informal sellers will be higher (lower) than the payoff for formal sellers, causing
sellers to migrate into (out of) the informal market, until sin = s∗. Thus, a stable equilibrium
is such that any point to the left (right) of B will move in a rightward (leftwards) direction and
any point below (above) S will move upwards (downwards).
46Heuristically, this means we can think of B as a roughly “vertical” curve near (b∗, s∗), whereas S is roughly
“horizontal” near (b∗, s∗).
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We say there is a pure formal market equilibrium if the point (bin , sin) = (0, 0) satisfies the
equilibrium condition given by (18). We say there is a pure informal market equilibrium if
the point (bin , sin) = (b, 1) satisfies equation (18). Finally a mixed-market equilibrium is a point
(b∗, s∗) ∈ (0, b)×(0, 1) which satisfies equation (18). To establish the robust co-existence of formal
and informal markets, we must show that there exists a locally stable mixed-market equilibrium.
Remark 2. The equilibrium equation (18) can also be interpreted as an uncorrelated, sym-
metric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium or an equilibrium under replicator/imitation dynamics;
see Appendix B for details.
4.5 Properties of the equilibrium
Given the complexity of the model, no simple closed form solutions exist, a numerical analysis is
required to determine further properties of the equilibrium. We now examine different scenarios
and explore the corresponding equilibrium properties.
4.5.1 No Taxes and No Quality Assurance
To isolate the implications of the trading protocol, we first consider an environment with Tax = 0
and gin = gfo . In other words, we initially suppose that the formal market has no quality assurance
advantage, and that neither market has a tax advantage. This would occur, for example, if the
tax rate in the formal market exactly matched the rate of theft in the informal market, and if
products had zero probability of defects or if α(q) = q for all q.
When Tax = 0 and Lbu = Lse = 0, the two curves S(0, 0) and B(0) characterizing the stability
of the equilibrium are very close to the diagonal. Heuristically, this means that buyers and sellers
are both essentially indifferent between the two markets, as long as
bin
sin
= b =
bfo
sfo
. (20)
Numerical analysis suggest that, in this case, buyers and sellers exhibit a very weak preference
for an all-formal market equilibrium. But the difference in payoff between the all-formal market
equilibrium and other points on the diagonal (20) is so small that all points on this diagonal could
be regarded as “quasi-equilibria”. However, if Lbu 6= 0 and Lse 6= 0, then the picture becomes
much clearer.
Result 2. Suppose Tax = 0. Then numerical methods suggest that:
(a) if Lbu and Lse have opposite signs, and |Lbu | and |Lse| are large enough, then there is a
locally stable mixed-market equilibrium;
20
(b) if Lbu < 0 and Lse < 0, and |Lbu | and |Lse| are large enough, there exists a locally stable
pure formal market equilibrium;
(c) if Lbu > 0 and Lse > 0, and |Lbu | and |Lse| are large enough, there exists a locally stable
pure informal market equilibrium.
In all three cases, the equilibrium appears to be unique.
To gain some deeper understanding of Result 2, notice that an equilibrium (18) is any crossing
point of the isocline B(Lbu) (from equation (19)) and the isocline
S(0, Lse) :=
{
(sin , bin) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, b] ; U fose
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
− Lse = U inse
(
bin
sin
)}
.
Let us now define the functions β, σ : [0, b]× [0, 1]−→R by setting
σ(bin , sin) :=U
in
se
(
bin
sin
)
− U fose
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
and β(bin , sin) :=U
in
bu
(
bin
sin
)
− U fobu
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
,
for all bin ∈ [0, b] and sin ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose Lse = 0; then σ measures how relatively attractive
the informal market is for sellers. If σ(bin , sin) is positive (negative), then sellers will move into
(out of) the informal market, so sin will increase (decrease). Likewise, suppose Lbu = 0; then
β measures how relatively attractive the informal market is for buyers. If β(bin , sin) is positive
(negative), then buyers will move into (out of) the informal market, so bin will increase (decrease).
The isocontours of β are the isoclines B(Lbu) for various choices of Lbu . The isocontours of σ
are the isoclines S(0, Lse) for various choices of Lse . These isocontours cross if and only if the
gradient vector field ∇σ is not parallel to the gradient vector field ∇β. So this is what we must
verify to demonstrate Result 2.
If the two gradient vector fields were parallel, then we would have
φ(bin , sin) :=
∇σ(bin , sin) • ∇β(bin , sin)
‖∇σ(bin , sin)‖ · ‖∇β(bin , sin)‖ = ±1, (21)
for all bin ∈ [0, b] and sin ∈ [0, 1]. Using a symbolic computation package like Mathematica or
Maple, it is easy to verify that φ(bin , sin) 6= ±1, for any choice of (bin , sin) which is not close to
the diagonal line {(bin , sin); bin/sin = b/s} or the lines sin = 0 or sin = 1.47
Any crossing of the isoclines B(Lbu) and S(0, Lse) will determine an equilibrium (18) of the
economy. However, not all such equilibria are locally stable. If the absolute slope of S(0, Lse) is
47Maple source code for this computation and all the computations described in the rest of this section is
available on request from the authors.
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Figure 1: (A) A locally stable mixed-market equilibrium defined by the crossing of S(0,−0.5) (dashed line)
and B(0.5) (solid line). (B) A locally stable mixed-market equilibrium defined by the crossing of S(0, 0.4)
and B(−0.4). (C) A pure formal market equilibrium (0, 0) exists for S(0,−0.1) and B(−0.1). (D) A pure
informal market equilibrium (b, s) for S(0, 0.1) and B(0.1).
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less than the absolute slope of B(Lbu) when they cross, then it is easy to check that conditions
(i)-(iii) from Section 4.4 are satisfied, so that the equilibrium is locally stable. For illustration
purposes of Result 2, consider b = s, δ = 0.99 and gin = gfo ; the S-isoclines are the dashed
curves, while the B-isoclines are the solid curves. In particular, Figure 1(A) shows the curves
B(0.5) and S(0,−0.5) intersecting in a locally stable equilibrium. Figure 1(B) shows the curves
B(−0.4) and S(0, 0.4) intersecting in a locally stable equilibrium. Furthermore, a plot of the
vector fields defined by best response differential equations (16) reveals that these equilibria are
in fact global attractors; see Figures 5(A,B) in Appendix D.48
Thus, there is a stable equilibrium with a mixture of formal and informal markets whenever
the buyers and sellers face lump-sum costs in different markets. However, if both buyers and
sellers face lump-sum costs in the same market, then the isoclines do not cross. In this case,
the dynamics cause all buyers and sellers to migrate to the market without the lump-sum costs.
If S(0, Lse) is always below B(Lbu), then all buyers and sellers migrate to the formal market, as
described by Result 2(b). If S(0, Lse) is always above B(Lbu), then all buyers and sellers migrate
to the informal market, as described by Result 2(c). Figures 1(C,D) illustrate these cases. (Once
again, the associated vector fields reveals that these equilibria are global attractors; see Figures
5(C,D) in Appendix D.)
4.5.2 Crime and taxation
In the previous numerical example, we studied the case where the tax rate in the formal sector
is exactly equal to the crime rate in the informal sector, so that Tax = 0. Ceteris paribus, raising
tax rates in the formal sector (or lowering crime rates in the informal sector) will cause some
buyers and sellers to migrate from the formal to the informal market. To see this, consider the
isocline
S(Tax , Lse) :=
{
(sin , bin) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, b] ; (1− Tax)U fose
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
− Lse = U inse
(
bin
sin
)}
for any net tax level Tax . We claim that increasing Tax will cause this curve to shift upwards. As
a result, a higher formal taxes will cause a larger fraction of both buyers and sellers to migrate
to the informal sector. However, as long as the net tax is small enough, the equilibrium is such
that formal and informal markets of non-trivial size exists.
To illustrate this point, suppose for simplicity that Lse = 0.4 and bin = b/2. In Figure 2(a),
the horizontal axis represents sin , and the downward sloping curve is U
in
se (b/2, sin) —the payoff
for informal sellers, as a function of sin . The upward sloping curves are the payoffs for formal
sellers, as a function of sin . The dotted curve is U
fo
se (b/2, s − sin) − 0.4; this is the payoff with
Tax = 0 (i.e. no net taxation). The dashed curve is 0.7 · U fose (b/2, s− sin)− 0.4; this is the payoff
48We find the same qualitative results when alternative parameterizations are used.
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Figure 2: Crime and taxation when Lse > 0 > Lbu .
with Tax = 0.3 (i.e. a net taxation rate of 30%). Note how the intersection with U
in
se (b/2, sin)
shifts to the right as we increase Tax , indicating that equilibrium occurs at a higher value of sin
(i.e. more sellers enter the informal market). By repeating this argument for every value of bin ,
we can see that the curve S(0.3, 0.4) must be above the curve S(0, 0.4). Since B slopes upwards,
the intersection of S(0.3, 0.4) with the curve B(Lbu) will thus be northeast of the intersection of
S(0, 0.4) with the curve B(Lbu), as shown in Figure 2(b). In other words, higher formal taxes
will cause a larger fraction of both buyers and sellers to migrate to the informal sector. However,
as long as the net tax is small enough, the new equilibrium is still a mixed-market type. Figure
2 illustrates the claim for Lse := 0.4 and Lbu = −0.4, but we would get a similar picture for any
Lbu < 0 < Lse .49
Figure 2 showed the case when Lse > 0 > Lbu so that sellers must pay a net lump-sum cost
to enter the formal sector (e.g. the costs of retail space and licenses), while buyers pay a net
lump-sum cost to enter the formal sector (e.g. inconvenience). Figure 3 shows the opposite case,
when Lse < 0 < Lbu . In particular, we set Lse = −0.4 while Lbu := 0.4, and we compare the net
tax levels Tax = 0 and Tax = 0.5. The impact of taxation is similar to that in Figure 2.50
Note that the impact of taxation is stronger in Figure 2 than in Figure 3, despite the fact
that the net tax increase in Figure 3 was Tax = 0.5, whereas in Figure 2 it was only Tax = 0.3.
In other words, the effect of taxation depends on the relative lump-sum entry costs sellers and
buyers face in the formal market: taxation causes a stronger effect in a situation when the sellers
49We find the same qualitative results when alternative parameterizations are used.
50We would get a similar picture for any Lbu > 0 > Lse .
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Figure 3: Crime and taxation when Lse < 0 < Lbu .
(but not buyers) must pay a net positive fee to enter the formal market, whereas taxation causes
a weaker effect when it is buyers (but not sellers) who must pay a net fee to enter the formal
market.51
The results in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 are consistent with the work of Oviedo et al. (2009),
among other authors, who document the types of policies that high-income OECD countries
have used to redirect workers from the informal economy into the formal market. The most com-
mon policies or reform packages used by various countries tend to include five crucial elements:
(i) reducing the costs of operating in the formal market; (ii) improving the audit technology
and enforcement in the informal economy; (iii) improving the taxing authority’s communica-
tion strategy with the formal sector; (iv) modernizing administrative and regulatory processes
and functions in the formal market and (v) providing basic social protection for all, so that the
informal economy would not be viewed by the unemployed as a substitute for social protection.
4.5.3 Quality assurance versus taxation
In all of our numerical analysis so far, we have assumed that gin = gfo , so that the formal market
has no advantage over the informal market due to quality assurance. This would be the case, for
example, if the quality assurance technology has constant returns to scale.
In this section, we examine a situation where gin < gfo so that quality assurance gives the
formal market an advantage and creates an extra surplus that the government can tax. For
instance, let us suppose that gin = 0.7 gfo . Figure 4(a) shows a market with no net taxation and
51We find the same qualitative results when alternative parameterizations are used.
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Figure 4: Quality assurance versus taxation. (a) If gin = 0.7 gfo , then all buyers and sellers migrate to the formal
market because of its quality assurance advantage. (b) The formal market remains the only stable equilibrium,
even if the government imposes 45% taxation.
no lump-sum costs (i.e. Tax = Lse = Lbu = 0). We see that S(0, 0) is always below B(0), so all
buyers and sellers migrate to the formal market. Figure 4(b) shows a market with no lump-sum
costs (i.e. Lse = Lbu = 0), but with a 45% net tax rate on the formal sector (i.e. Tax = 0.45), we
see that S(0.45, 0) is still below B(0), so that all buyers and sellers remain in the formal market.
Thus, if the formal market has even a small quality assurance advantage, then it can withstand
a large amount of government taxation.
Notwithstanding the absence of an informal market in the equilibrium in Figure 4, if the
burden of taxation or regulation in the formal market is high enough, then the equilibrium will
involve a nonzero amount of informal activity, despite the formal market’s quality assurance
advantage. Thus, in contrast to the conventional wisdom and the literature cited above, our
analysis suggests that introducing more regulation can sometimes shift activity from informal to
formal markets. Of course, this will only occur if the advantages of enhanced quality assurance
outweigh the administrative costs of regulatory compliance. Note that our model predictions are
consistent with the findings of Gambetta (1988), Beckert (2005) and Mollering (2006). These
authors highlight that when purchasing goods from the informal sector, risks faced by informal
buyers arise from the asymmetric information regarding product quality in light of incomplete
or non-enforceable contracts when buying in these markets.52
52We refer to Loayza (1996) for the role of confiscation in the informal sector.
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5 Conclusion
There is a long tradition in economics of investigating which trading protocols survive in equi-
librium. In this paper, we explore when bargaining and price posting can co-exist. We do so
within the context of the formal and informal markets, as these two trading protocols have very
different informational requirements for trade to take place. In particular, formal sellers must
publicly advertise their prices and locations in order to attract buyers. Price posting is then a
suitable trading protocol for formal sellers. Instead, informal sellers avoid publicly disclosing
their exact locations and prices as to evade taxes and regulations. Bargaining then fits the needs
of informal sellers. Building on this insight, we also consider other distinguishing features (taxes,
crime and quality assurance) to determine when price posting and bargaining can co-exist. To
this end, we consider an evolutionary framework where agents’ payoffs depend on the ratio of
buyers and sellers in each of these markets. All agents try to position themselves in the market
which can yield them the highest possible payoff. This strategic interaction in turn critically
affects the relative size and the evolution of these two markets.
When only sellers can switch between formal and informal markets, we analytically show
that formal and informal markets of nontrivial size co-exist in a stable equilibrium. We also
demonstrate that some sellers will switch from formal to informal markets whenever the formal
sellers’ quality assurance erodes, the government imposes higher taxes and regulations in the
formal market, the risk of crime and/or confiscation decreases in the informal market, or the
number of buyers in the informal market increases. Conversely, sellers will switch from the
informal to the formal market whenever the contrary changes take place. The contrast between
our conclusions and those of Lu and McAfee (1996) and Kultti (1999) is partly because agents in
our environment are replaced differently, and partly because we also consider various additional
features that distinguish the formal and informal markets. These extra asymmetries affect the
differential seller’s payoffs when trading in formal and informal markets and determining when
co-existence is possible.
If we relax the immobility of buyers and allow both buyers and sellers to switch between
formal and informal markets, and if the net lump-sum cost for a seller in the formal sector
relative to that in the informal sector and the net lump-sum cost for a buyer in the formal sector
relative to that in the informal sector have opposite signs, then we again obtain a locally stable
equilibrium in which formal and informal markets co-exist. However, if the above-mentioned
different relative net lump-sum costs are both negative (positive), then there exist a unique
locally stable equilibrium where only formal (informal) activity takes place in the long run.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma A. The efficient value q∗ of investment in quality assurance is the value
such that α′∗) = 1 (i.e. such that one additional cent spent on quality assurance increases the
buyer’s expected utility by exactly one cent). Since α′ is nonincreasing (by concavity), we have
α′(q) ≥ 1 for all q ∈ [0, q∗]. Thus, since α(0) = 0, the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus implies
that α(q∗) ≥ q∗ (i.e. the benefit of quality assurance outweighs its cost). Thus,
gfo
gin
=
vfobu − cfose
vinbu − cinse =
vinbu + α(q)− cinse − q
vinbu − cinse = 1 +
α(q)− q
vinbu − cinse ≥ 1,
because α(q) ≥ q. Thus, gin ≤ gfo . 2
Proof of Theorem 1. We must show that the interval [0, 1] contains a zero for the function
U˜ . By inspecting formulae (5) and (9), we see that, for all sfo ∈ [0, 1], we have
U˜(sfo) = U˜
fo
se (sfo)− U˜ inse (sfo) = (1− T fose ) Û(sfo),
with Û(sfo) := Û1(sfo)−K Û2(sfo),
where K :=
(1− T inse ) gin
(1− T fose ) , (22)
while Û1(sfo) :=
[
1− exp
(−bfo
sfo
)]
·
(
1− b
fo/sfo
exp(bfo/sfo)− 1
)
, by Eq.(5),
and Û2(sfo) := η
(
bin
1− sfo
)
·
[
1− exp
( −bin
1− sfo
)]
by Eq.(9).
Clearly, it will be sufficient to find a zero for Û instead. From equation (8), simple computations
yield:
lim
s↘0
Û(s) = 1−K η(bin) (1− exp(−bin)) and lim
s↗1
Û(s) = 1− 1 + b
fo
exp(bfo)
−K.
From here, it is easy to check that(
K <
1
η(bin) (1− exp(−bin))
)
=⇒
(
lim
s↘0
Û(s) > 0
)
and
(
K > 1− b
fo + 1
exp(bfo)
)
=⇒
(
lim
s↗1
Û(s) < 0
)
.
(23)
But Û is continuous on [0, 1]. Thus, if K satisfies both the conditions in (23), then the Interme-
diate Value Theorem implies that Û(s∗) = 0 for some s∗ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, Û is going from
positive values (near 0) to negative values (near 1), so Û must be decreasing near s∗; hence s∗ is
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a stable equilibrium.
Now, it is easy to check that the function Û2 is positive everywhere on [0, 1]. Thus, if K
increases, then the graph of Û will move downwards everywhere. Since Û is decreasing near s∗,
a downwards movement of the graph will cause s∗ to move to the left in the interval [0, 1]. In
other words, s∗ will decrease when K increases. By inspection of formula (22), K is increasing
with gin and T
fo
se , while it is decreasing with T
in
se . Thus, s∗ is decreasing with gin and T
fo
se , and
increasing with T
in
se .
Meanwhile, Û1 is clearly increasing as a function of bfo , and independent of bin . On the other
hand, Û2 is independent of bfo , but increasing as a function of bin (because η is an increasing
function, by hypothesis). Thus, Û is decreasing as a function of bin (because K is positive by
inspection of formula (22)). Thus, if we increase bfo , then the graph of Û is will move upwards
(and hence, s∗ will move to the right), whereas if we increase bin , then the graph of Û will move
downwards (hence, s∗ will move to the left). Thus, s∗ is an increasing function of bfo , and a
decreasing function of bin . 2
Appendix B: Replicator/Imitation Dynamics
Here we sketch another evolutionary framework that leads to the equilibrium represented by
equation (11). As in the model of best response dynamics described in in Section 3.4, we suppose
there is an infinite sequence of time periods, with trade occurring in each market during each
time period. But instead of migrating between markets in response to higher payoffs, agents
learn by imitating other agents. The more agents choose a particular strategy, and the better
they are doing relative to the average payoff, the more likely it is that other agents will imitate
their behavior.
Alternatively, we can interpret the same model in terms of successive generations of agents.
During each time period, some agents produce one or more children, and some agents die.
Children remain in the same market as their parents.53 The net reproductive rate (births minus
deaths) of each market type is determined by how much the payoff for that market exceeds the
population average payoff. To be precise, the population average payoff for sellers at time t is
given by:
sfo(t)U
fo
se [bfo(t)/sfo(t)] + sin(t)U
in
se [bin(t)/sin(t)]
so the reproductive rate of the formal sellers will be:
ρ(t) = (1− sfo(t))U fose [bfo(t)/sfo(t)]− sin(t)U inse [bin(t)/sin(t)] .
53Note that, this interpretation is not conducive to view the model as a repeated game, since individual agents
only live for one period, after which their offspring replace them.
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The population of formal sellers will grow (or shrink) exponentially at this rate. Formally, we
have s˙fo(t) = λse ρ(t) · sfo(t), where λse > 0 is some constant. This leads to the following
dynamical equation
s˙fo(t) = −s˙in(t) = λse sfo(t) sin(t)
(
U˜
fo
se
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− U˜ inse
(
bin(t)
sin(t)
))
, (24)
where λse > 0 is a constant. Again, this dynamical equation has both a discrete-time and
a continuous-time interpretation. In either case, equation (11) is a necessary and sufficient
condition for a population distribution (sfo , sin) to be a “nontrivial” fixed point of the dynamics.
Here, “nontrivial” refers to the fact that the replicator dynamics always have “trivial” fixed
points where sfo = 0 or s in = 0. However, unless these “pure population” equilibria arise from
a solution to equation (11), they are generally unstable to small perturbations. Thus, a pure
population of this type will be destabilized as soon as even one of the reproducing agents produces
a “mutant” child of the opposite type. Thus, we can safely ignore these trivial equilibria, and
focus only on the equilibria described by equation (11).
Both Buyers and Sellers Switching between Markets
Finally, we could suppose that the buyer/seller populations both evolve according to replica-
tor/imitation dynamics. This yields dynamical equations:
s˙fo(t) = −s˙in(t) = λse sfo(t) sin(t)
(
(1− Tax)U fose
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− Lse − U inse
(
bin(t)
sin(t)
))
and
b˙fo(t) = −b˙in(t) = λbu bfo(t) bin(t)
(
U
fo
bu
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− Lbu − U inbu
(
bin(t)
sin(t)
))
,
(25)
where λse > 0 and λbu > 0 are constants. Again, this dynamical equation has both a discrete-time
and a continuous-time interpretation. In either case, equation (18) from Section 4.4 is a necessary
and sufficient condition for a population distribution (bfo , bin , sfo , sin) to be a “nontrivial” fixed
point of the dynamics (25). Here, “nontrivial” refers to the fact that the replicator dynamics
always has “trivial” fixed points where either bfo = 0 or bin = 0 and either sfo = 0 or sin = 0.
Note that the vector field determined by (25) is obtained by multiplying the vector field
defined by (16) by a scalar function which is positive everywhere in (0, b)× (0, 1). Thus, a stable
fixed point for (16) is also a stable fixed point for (25).
Appendix C: Alphabetical Index of Notation
α(q) Benefit (to the formal buyers) of quality assurance (e.g. warranties, free repair service, etc.)
bin Ratio of buyers in the informal market, relative to population of sellers in both markets.
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bfo Ratio of buyers in the formal market, relative to population of sellers in both markets.
b = bin + bfo . Overall ratio of buyers to sellers in the whole economy.
Bf := bfo/sfo . Ratio of buyers to sellers in formal market.
Bi := bin/sin . Ratio of buyers to sellers in the informal market.
cinse Cost of production in the informal market.
cfose Cost of production in the formal market. (Includes quality assurance, but not taxes or regulatory compli-
ance.)
δ Discount factor (in section 4).
η Bargaining strength of informal sellers (in section 3).
gin := vinbu − cinse . The gains from trade in the informal market.
gfo := vfobu − cfose . The gains from trade in the formal market.
L
in
bu Lump sum costs for informal buyers (e.g. inconvenience).
L
fo
bu Lump sum costs for formal buyers (e.g. transportation and shoe leather costs).
L
in
se Lump sum costs for informal sellers (e.g. crime risk, bribery, protection money, shoe leather).
L
fo
se Lump sum costs for formal sellers (e.g. regulatory compliance, license fees, rent).
Lbu “Net” lump sum costs for formal buyers.
Lse “Net” lump sum costs for formal sellers.
P
in
bu Match probability for informal buyers.
P
fo
bu Match probability for formal buyers.
P
in
se Match probability for informal sellers.
P
fo
se Match probability for formal sellers.
q Expenditure on quality assurance technology by formal sellers.
R
in
se = 1− T inse , the residual earnings rate for informal sellers.
R
fo
se = 1− T fose , the residual earnings rate for formal sellers.
Rse = R
fo
se/R
in
se , the “net” residual earnings rate for formal sellers.
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sin Proportion of sellers in the informal market.
sfo Proportion of sellers in the formal market.
t Time (in dynamical interpretation of model).
T
in
se Expected costs of monetary crime for informal sellers.
T
fo
se Taxes and unit regulatory costs for formal sellers.
Tax “Net” tax burden for formal sellers.
uinbu Utility of a purchase for informal buyers.
ufobu Utility of a purchase for formal buyers.
uinse Utility of a sale for informal sellers.
ufose Utility of a sale for formal sellers.
U
in
bu = P
in
buuinbu , the expected utility of informal buyers.
U
fo
bu = P
fo
buufobu , the expected utility of formal buyers.
U
in
se = P
in
se uinse , the expected utility of informal sellers.
U
fo
se = P
fo
se ufose , the expected utility of formal sellers.
vinbu Value of merchandise to informal buyer.
vfobu Value of merchandise to formal buyer.
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Appendix D: Best response vector fields
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Figure 5: The vector fields generated by the best response differential equations (16), for the four cases shown
in Figure 1. (A) (A) The mixed-market equilibrium defined by the crossing of S(0,−0.5) and B(0.5) is a global
attractor. (B) The mixed-market equilibrium defined by the crossing of S(0, 0.4) and B(−0.4) is a global
attractor. (C) The pure formal market equilibrium (0, 0) is a global attractor. (D) The pure informal market
equilibrium (b, s) is a global attractor.
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